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FACTS 
It is necessary for Mountain Bell to clarify some of the 
factual representations in Respondents' Brief. 
Mountain Bell's initial brief attempted to show the potential 
effect of pooling. Mountain Bell cited evidence presented during 
the hearings by a witness from the Division of Public Utilities 
(the Division), who estimated that approximately 8 percent of 
Mountain Bell's customers could qualify for Lifeline while up to 
20 percent of Contel's customers could qualify (Mountain Bell's 
Brief at 6). Respondents claim that Mountain Bell, in citing this 
evidence, has "materially distorted" the effect of surcharge 
pooling (Respondents' Brief at 8). In that regard, Respondents 
make the following claim: 
the actual percentages, based upon the program as adopted, 
are: Bell 6.38%, and Contel 7.85%. Bell stipulated to the 
figures (potential Lifeline customers, residential line 
counts) that go into these actual percentage computations. 
(id.) In attempting to establish distortion by Mountain Bell, 
Respondents fail to mention that all figures cited by all parties 
were nothing more than estimates. Mountain Bell never stipulated 
that the figures cited by Respondents were the correct numbers of 
Lifeline customers. The Lifeline program had not yet been 
implemented when that estimate was made, and it was therefore 
impossible to determine precisely how many customers would 
ultimately apply for Lifeline rates. Mountain Bell's only purpose 
in referring to the Division's estimate was to point out that if 
the estimate were accurate, the effect would be subsidization by 
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Mountain Bell customers of Lifeline customers in other companies. 
In any event, the veracity of either estimate is irrelevant, 
since the legal question presented in this appeal is whether the 
Commission can require pooling to fund the Lifeline program, 
irrespective of who may or may not be subsidized. 
ARGUMENT 
I. RESPONDENTS HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD THE NATURE OF THE APPEAL 
AND HAVE THEREFORE ARGUED AN INCORRECT STANDARD OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW. 
Respondents classify Mountain Bell's appeal as nothing more 
than a rate discrimination case (Respondents7 Brief at 13)• To 
reach this conclusion, Respondents mischaracterize Mountain Bell's 
theory as an argument that the customers singled out to subsidize 
Lifeline service were inappropriately classified, which results in 
discrimination against Mountain Bell's customers. (Id.) 
Respondents then apply Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Utah 
Public Services Commission, 636 P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981), and 
conclude, citing Utah Department of Administrative Services v. 
Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983), that this 
appeal is based on a "reasonableness" standard, and therefore the 
pooling arrangement should be deemed invalid only if it is 
unreasonable or irrational (Respondents7 Brief at 12). 
Respondents completely misinterpret both the holding of the 
Mountain States case and Mountain Bell's theory for this appeal. 
Mountain States stands only for the proposition that, within 
appropriate boundaries, the Commission has authority to enact a 
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Lifeline program as part of its ratemaking power. The central 
issue in Mountain States involved the classification of those who 
would be eligible for a Lifeline "senior citizen" discount rate. 
The question was whether there were adequate facts to support the 
conclusion that elderly subscribers could be separated into a 
distinct subclass of customers. The Commission had based its 
classification on the assumptions that, as a group, senior 
citizens had annual incomes that were significantly less than the 
incomes of other subscribers and that they consumed less energy 
per household than those who would subsidize their reduced rate. 
This Court held that the classification was not based on adequate 
factual findings. 
Mountain Bell does not challenge the validity of the 
classification in the telephone Lifeline program. The 
classification is based upon the same criteria as state public 
assistance programs. Mountain Bell challenges only the pooling 
program that requires one utility company's customers to subsidize 
another utility company's customers when the service being 
subsidized does not physically extend beyond the boundaries of 
each company's servicing area. Therefore, to compare this appeal 
to the Mountain States case for purposes of deciding what level of 
judicial deference should be given the Commission's decision 
misconstrues the nature of the appeal. 
Mountain Bell's appeal is not based on the classifications, 
but rather on the funding mechanism by which the benefitted class 
is subsidized. This issue turns only upon whether the Commission 
has been empowered by the legislature to establish a rule, the 
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effect of which is to require one company to subsidize another 
company for a singular service that is not jointly provide and 
which does not extend beyond each company's service boundaries. 
The resolution of the issue requires no factual inquiry. It is a 
question of law. In Utah Department of Administrative Services v. 
Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983), this court 
held that no judicial deference is required when the review 
involves the "interpretations of general questions of law." Id. 
at 608. Respondents admit this in their brief (Respondents7 Brief 
at 12). Because the appeal addresses the question whether "the 
Commission has acted beyond its statutory jurisdiction and 
authority," no judicial deference is to be accorded the 
Commission's Orders or Rules. Id. 
II. THERE IS NO STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION TO SUPPORT THE COMMISSION 
ORDER REQUIRING INTER-COMPANY POOLING AS THE LIFELINE FUNDING 
MECHANISM. 
A. Respondents have failed to show any statute that 
expressly grants or clearly implies authorization for the 
Commission action requiring inter-company pooling. 
Respondents, citing Section 54-4-1,-1- argue that "the 
Commission need not be expressly authorized to do every specific 
act it undertakes." (Id. at 14) This is a correct statement of 
law. But, it does not mean, as Respondents claim, that a 
Commission's action is authorized because it may be deemed 
necessary or convenient. (Id.) If the Commission is not 
expressly authorized to do a certain act, its authority must be 
!A11 statutory references will be to Utah Code Ann., 1953, 
unless otherwise noted. 
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clearly implied by statute. Basin Flying Service v. Public 
Service Commission, 531 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah 1975). See also 
Interwest Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 510 P.2d 919, 920 
(Utah 1973). Even the case cited by Respondents to support their 
argument that an act by the Commission need be only necessary or 
convenient demonstrates the need for the authority to act to be 
clearly implied by statute. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Public 
Service Commission, 712 P.2d 251 (Utah 1985). In Utah Power & 
Light, the utility challenged a Commission order that extended the 
time within which some Southern Utah municipalities could exercise 
options to purchase electrical distribution systems. The Court's 
decision to uphold the Commission's order relied not only on 
Section 54-4-1, but also on Section 54-4-30. Among other things, 
Section 54-4-30 prohibits the acquisition of property of one 
utility by another without the consent and approval of the 
Commission. The Court held that Section 54-4-3 0 was more 
applicable but that "[i]n view of the two foregoing statutes, it 
is clear that the PSC had jurisdiction over the sale of the CPN 
system to UP & L." Id. at 252. Thus, Utah Power and Light 
supports the requirement that the Commission's authority must, at 
the very least, be implied by statute. 
No Utah statute expressly grants or clearly implies 
Commission authority to pool together the subsidies of separate 
and distinct companies in order to fund Lifeline subscribers. In 
addition to Section 54-4-1, Respondents cite various statutes, 
including Section 54-3-1 (requiring the rates to be just and 
reasonable), Section 54-4-4 (allowing the Commission to monitor 
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and enforce "just and reasonable" rates) and Section 54-4-7^ 
(authorizing the Commission to ensure that a utility's equipment, 
facilities and methods of manufacture are appropriate). None of 
these statutes (either specifically or in general terms) addresses 
inter-company pooling to provide a subsidized service to the 
indigent. Yet Respondents throw all of these statutes into a grab 
bag and conclude that "[c]onstrued together, these statutes 
authorize the Commission to fund the telephone Lifeline program 
through a pooling of surcharges." (Respondents' Brief at 15). 
Such a conclusion begs the question and assumes away the 
requirement of demonstrating specific statutory authorization. 
Interwest Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 510 P.2d 919 
(Utah 1973), Basin Flying Service v. Public Service Commission, 
531 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1975), and Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission, 682 P.2d 1216 (1984) are a trilogy of cases 
that firmly establish the principle that actions by the Commission 
must be supported by specific statutory authority (see Mountain 
Bell's Brief at 11-14). Respondents virtually ignore these cases 
and, instead, cite White River Shale Oil v. Public Service 
Commission. 700 P.2d 1088 (Utah 1985), for the proposition that it 
is proper for the legislature to enact broadly worded statutes 
within the Public Utilities Act. White River does not purport to 
overrule Interwest. Basin Flying Service, or Kearns-Tribune. 
These cases do not hold, nor has Mountain Bell argued, that "every 
broadly phrased statute must be read out of the utilities code" 
2Mountain Bell addressed Section 54-4-7 at length in its 
initial brief (Mountain Bell Brief at 16-18). 
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(Respondents7 Brief at 18), as was stated by Respondents. In an 
attempt to find a statutory peg upon which the Lifeline pooling 
arrangement can be hung, Respondents have again missed the point. 
As much as Respondents resist the requirement of demonstrating the 
existence of an express or clearly implied authorization for the 
pooling arrangement, that is, nevertheless, the standard upon 
which Commission actions must be scrutinized by this Court. 
B. "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius" is an appropriate rule 
of statutory construction in the Lifeline context. 
In Rio Grande Motor Way, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 
445 P.2d 990 (Utah 1968) the' Court, in reference to the maxim 
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius," stated: "It is 
appreciated that that maxim is sometimes helpful in determining 
the meaning of an otherwise questionable statute." Id. 
Respondents seemingly cite Rio Grande for the proposition that the 
expressio unius maxim is never a valid aid in construing statutory 
intent (Respondents7 Brief at 19-20). Such a claim is absurd, 
particularly in light of the numerous instances where this Court 
has applied the rule in cases that have come before the Court 
since the Rio Grande case. See, e.g.. Hansen v. Wilkinson, 658 
P.2d 1216 (Utah 1983); Cannon v. Gardner. 611 P.2d 1207 (Utah 
1980); Olvmpia Sales Co. v. Long, 604 P.2d 919 (Utah 1979). 
Although Rio Grande cautions against inappropriate reliance on it, 
the maxim is a functional tool and its usefulness "depends upon an 
analysis of the legislative enactment to which it is sought to be 
applied." 445 P.2d at 992. 
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An analysis of the statutes in question demonstrates that it 
is entirely appropriate to apply the expressio unius maxim in this 
case. Where Section 54-4-12 specifically grants the Commission 
the power to pool for jointly provided services, such as long 
distance, the lack of a similar grant of power where services are 
not jointly provided is an appropriate situation in which to apply 
the rule of construction. The application of this rule of 
construction leads to the conclusion that the legislature did not 
intend to grant the Commission the power to require pooling in the 
Lifeline context. 
III. THE MOUNTAIN STATES CASE DOES NOT SUPPORT RESPONDENTS' 
ARGUMENTS. 
Respondents argue that a subsidy is an inherent part of 
ratemaking and cite Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Public 
Service Commission, 636 P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981) as the sustaining 
precedent. (See Respondents' Brief at 30). If anything, 
Respondents' reasoning supports Mountain Bell's claim that the 
Commission order requiring Mountain Bell Lifeline pooling is not 
proper ratemaking. In Mountain States, the Court stated: 
Although the Commission exercises a form of legislative power 
in rate making, it is not the same as the Legislature. The 
legality and legitimacy of its orders rest on well 
articulated findings and reasons which are in accord with 
governing law. 
Id. at 1058. Mountain States holds that a Lifeline program can be 
enacted by the Commission only if the Commission has exercised 
proper ratemaking authority. Id. Although Respondents argue that 
Mountain States is "the precedent governing this surcharge pooling 
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issue," (Respondents7 Brief at 26), it is also significant that 
Mountain States never addressed multi-company pooling 
arrangements. Mountain States involved only one utility company, 
Utah Power & Light. The Commission did not require that Utah 
Power customers fund the Lifeline rate to indigent customers in 
other power companies. Mountain States does not support 
Respondents legal contentions3. 
IV. RESPONDENTS' UNSUBSTANTIATED CLAIMS REGARDING TOLL POOLING 
DOES NOT GRANT AUTHORITY TO THE COMMISSION. 
In their Brief, Respondents argue (without benefit of 
citations to the record) that under the toll pooling arrangement 
that exists today in Utah, portions of the pooled revenue relate 
to toll calls that are not jointly provided. (Respondents' Brief 
at 22). The apparent purpose of this factual assertion is to
 y 
validate Commission authority to require pooling to fund the 
Lifeline program. What Respondents fail to mention is that the 
present arrangements for toll pooling in Utah are based upon 
private contractual agreements between the various telephone 
companies. Whatever those private arrangements may be (and there 
is nothing in the record relating to them), they certainly cannot 
^Respondents never address the argument made by Mountain Bell 
in its opening brief, that ratemaking is properly done only on a 
company-specific basis (Mountain Bell Brief at 24-27). Any 
attempt to use the "ratemaking" power in an effort to require the 
ratepayers of one company to subsidize ratepayers in another 
company is an inappropriate use of the ratemaking power. Maine 
Water Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 482 A.2d 443 (Me. 1984). 
See also Utah Department of Business Regulation v. Public Service 
Commission, 720 P.2d 470 (Utah 1986). 
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grant authority to the Commission that does not independently 
exist under appropriate statutes. 
V. LIFELINE SERVICE IS NOT A JOINT SERVICE. THE COMMISSION THUS 
LACKS THE AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE POOLING. 
Respondents never come to grips with the key point that the 
Commission's only power to require pooling is in connection with 
jointly provided services. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-12. Lifeline 
service is not a jointly provided service* It is a discounted 
local exchange service (See Lifeline Rules § IV(1), R. 632). 
Lifeline service exists completely independent of whether 
companies interconnect for toll calling. Ironically, while they 
argue that the statutory basis for toll pooling "is the same as 
that for Lifeline surcharge pooling" (Respondents Brief at 22), 
Respondents never contend that Lifeline service is a jointly 
provided service. 
VI. MOUNTAIN BELL HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LIFELINE POOLING 
ARRANGEMENT. 
Respondents obliquely imply that, because any subsidization 
of Lifeline funding ultimately is paid by Mountain Bell 
subscribers, Mountain Bell lacks standing to challenge the pooling 
arrangement (Respondents Brief at 31). The argument is absurd. 
Mountain Bell was a party to the Lifeline proceeding. The 
Lifeline rules and orders explicitly apply to Mountain Bell. 
Section 54-7-16(1) makes it clear that "any party to the 
proceeding considering himself aggrieved" by the action of the 
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Commission may appeal to the Supreme Court. Mountain Bell clearly 
has standing. 
CONCLUSION 
The whole foundation of Respondents' argument is that without 
the subsidy from Mountain Bell, the Lifeline program cannot 
succeed. That conclusion is apparently based on the evidence 
(which Respondents rely on but criticize Mountain Bell for relying 
upon) that up to 20 percent of Contel customers could qualify for 
Lifeline service while only 8 percent of Mountain Bell's customers 
could qualify. Yet Respondents also conclude, based on another 
set of estimates, that Lifeline participation rates would be 
virtually identical in both Mountain Bell and Contel and therefore 
the subsidy by Mountain Bell "is so small that it can scarcely be 
measured." (Respondents' Brief at 9). Those contradictory 
conclusions simply cannot support Respondents' policy argument, 
if participation rates were essentially the same for all telephone 
companies, then company-specific funding would in no way threaten 
the viability of the Lifeline program and there would be no 
rational reason for requiring pooling. On the other hand, if 
participation rates vary from company to company, a company with 
lower participation rates will necessarily subsidize Lifeline 
customers in companies with higher participation rates. 
From a legal perspective, the version of the facts that is 
ultimately true is not determinative of the legal question as to 
whether the Commission has the power to require pooling. Nothing 
in Respondents' Brief undercuts the demonstration by Mountain Bell 
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in its initial Brief that the Commission lacks that power. While 
obscuring some of the issues, Respondents never come to grips with 
the fact that there is no explicit or implied statutory authority 
to support pooling. Therefore, the Lifeline Rules and Orders 
should be set aside on the ground that the pooling mechanism is 
beyond the Commission's power. 
DATED this 3rd day of December, 1987. 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND 
TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
By CA w£^=^ 
Ted D. Smith, Attorney 
Floyd A. Jensen, Attorney 
)>A>/ J^y^CXJ^^ 
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